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Abstract: During the early years of the United Nations Human Rights Council, formed in 2006, the 
African Group obstructed efforts to scrutinize and improve human rights in specific countries, notably in 
the cases of Darfur and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. However, in recent years the African 
Group has become willing to address country-specific human rights violations, particularly in Côte 
d'Ivoire, Libya, and Eritrea. This article documents the African Group's shift and asks why it occurred. 
Against the backdrop of debates about whether the liberal international order can survive a decline in 
American dominance, the study of the African Group's shift grants us insight into the elements that 
underpin liberal internationalism. Three explanations for the African Group's shift are considered: an 
improvement in the domestic human rights profile of African Group members, changes to the internal 
dynamics of the African Group, and the influence of the United States. The article concludes that 
American power was decisive, a finding that raises doubt about whether the liberal international order 
will survive a decline in American power. 
 
In 2005, former Secretary-General of the united nations, Kofi Annan, described the organization's 
Commission for Human Rights (CHR) as ‘increasingly undermined by its own lack of credibility and 
professionalism’.1 Many states, Annan argued, were using the CHR not to promote human rights but to 
protect themselves from criticism, thereby damaging the reputation of the entire UN system.2 Annan 
proposed replacing the CHR with a Human Rights Council (HRC). The new body was created in 2006. 
The HRC was supposed to ‘redress’ the faults of its predecessor, but initially seemed no better.3 In the 
assessment of Bertrand Ramcharan, a former acting UN High Commissioner for Human Rights:  
A key problem of the Council is that the African and Asian groups have been allocated 26 out of the 47 
seats. Many countries in these two regions have severe governance problems and have experienced 
numerous conflicts and situations of gross human rights violations …. [T]hey band together to prevent 
discussions of situations of gross human rights violations and forthright criticism of such violations. The 
present majority is unlikely to give up its numerical advantage. Unless the HRC can get over this 
difficulty, however, it will continue to be constrained in its capacity to act fairly to situations of gross 
violations.4 
Since Ramcharan made this statement in late 2010, appraisals of the HRC have become more favourable.5 
A widespread view is that ‘despite a shaky start, [the HRC] is generally seen to be performing well’.6 
Following Ramcharan, the HRC's increased responsiveness to human rights problems depended on some 
early obstructers becoming less antagonistic. Indeed, in recent years the African Group on the HRC has 
become increasingly willing to address human rights problems in specific countries. This article asks why 
this shift occurred. 
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Since the Second World War, human rights have eroded norms of state sovereignty.7 The spread of 
human rights has been deeply rooted in the post-war liberal international project.8 In turn, the creation and 
maintenance of the liberal international order has depended on the leadership and preponderance of a 
‘liberal Leviathan’, the United States. However, the increasing movement of wealth and power to 
developing countries has eaten into American dominance and has ushered in a less hierarchical world.9 
While there is little doubt that the future will ‘look less American’, will it ‘also look less liberal’?10 John 
Ikenberry, a leading liberal international relations theorist, maintains that the liberal features of the 
international order can survive detached from their American impetus.11 Realists, by contrast, see a much 
closer connection between international norms and state power. Citing examples that span five centuries, 
Stephen Krasner argues that international human rights regimes have only been consequential when the 
most powerful states have enforced the regime's prescriptions.12 The realist view that ‘when American 
power declines, the institutions and norms that American power has supported will decline’,13 spells the 
‘endtimes of human rights’, a reassertion of national sovereignty against human rights universalism.14 A 
study of the African Group's shift from illiberalism to liberalism allows us to gain insight into what 
sustains liberal values in international relations. This article considers three possible explanations. 
Research on voting in the CHR and HRC suggests that democracies and countries with good human 
rights records are more likely to support resolutions criticizing rights-abusing states.15 This research leads 
to the first potential explanation: the African Group's shift stemmed from an improvement in the domestic 
human rights records of the African HRC members. Informed insiders have echoed the aforementioned 
research,16 while International Relations theory presents two sets of reasons to explain the link between 
domestic and foreign human rights policy. The first set is liberal in character and directs our attention to 
an institutional make-up that makes pro-human rights foreign policy more likely.17 A second set of 
reasons emphasizes the influence of ideas, whereby foreign policy support for human rights is a reflection 
of the values and self-understandings characteristic of democratic countries. The claim that ideas are 
determinants of a state's international behaviour is most closely associated with the constructivist 
perspective, but is also present in ideational variants of liberalism.18 
A second possibility is that the African Group's improvement stems from changes internal to the Group, 
but that, unlike in the first explanation, these changes are less connected to domestic respect for human 
rights. Research on South Africa's regressive actions on the HRC reminds us that countries that support 
human rights at home might oppose these rights internationally.19 In other words, our focus should fall 
less on the regime type and more on the influence and role of specific delegations and diplomats in 
Geneva. In Geneva, unlike in New York, the African Group is not so quick to announce its position,20 
which allows more room for argument and choice. The second explanation is harder to place 
theoretically, but its emphasis on human agency brings it closest to liberalism.21 
The theoretical literature on international organizations directs us towards a third possible explanation for 
the African Group's embrace of country-specific scrutiny. The standard view of international 
organizations is that they are repositories of state action, designed to give states, particularly the most 
powerful ones, considerable control.22 The link between international organization and hegemonic power 
is most tightly drawn by advocates of realism. For John Mearsheimer, international organizations roughly 
reflect the distribution of power in the world and are domains in which power relations are acted out.23 In 
a unipolar world, international institutions do not primarily serve international interests, but rather the 
national interest of the most powerful state.24 The realist understanding of international organizations 
directs us to ask whether the US is behind the African Group's shift on the HRC. 
This article finds that changes in the domestic human rights profiles of African Group members do not 
account for the Group's increased willingness to address severe human rights problems in specific 
countries. In line with the second possible explanation, changes within the African Group, specifically the 
diminished sway of group members with regressive agendas, did matter, but were not the crucial factor. 
3 
 
Rather, the influence of the US, which became a member of the HRC in 2009 after having disengaged 
from this body during the Bush administration, was decisive in pushing African countries towards a 
willingness to support country-specific initiatives. Such a finding corresponds most closely to the realist 
perspective and casts doubt on the endurance of the liberal international project in the context of 
hegemonic decline. 
Beyond what it might reveal about what supports liberal values in the international order, the very fact of 
the African Group's change of course is significant for at least two further reasons. First, the African 
Group's recent support for country-specific scrutiny is a movement away from a post-colonial history in 
which strong norms of sovereignty and non-interference kept African governments from criticizing one 
another over human rights violations.25 It is also a movement that continues a tentative trend of African 
states allowing greater outside intrusion over human rights, as evidenced by the adoption of the African 
Peer Review Mechanism, an interventionist African Union Constitutive Act,26 the ‘responsibility to 
protect’, the Brahimi Report on peacekeeping, and the Rome Statute to create the International Criminal 
Court. 
Second, the African Group's acceptance of country-specific scrutiny points to improved relations between 
Africa and the UN. There has been a feeling that Africa has too little influence in the organization – 
‘global apartheid’ according to Adekeye Adebajo27 – while simultaneously being on the receiving end of 
many UN decisions – an imposition of Western cultural hegemony in Ali Mazrui's view.28 These 
imbalances are also visible in UN human rights forums where African states are often examined while 
scrutiny of the human rights consequences of Western actions has remained weak, for example in Iraq or 
Afghanistan.29 African states have responded by acting as a bloc because failure to do so would ‘spell 
disaster for weaker countries’.30 Despite abovementioned inequities and vulnerabilities, on the HRC the 
African Group has adopted an instrument it used to decry as a vehicle for Western meddling, has become 
less inclined to vote as a bloc, and has worked in closer partnership with Western states. 
The article consists of four parts. Part 1 demonstrates the African Group's initial opposition to unwelcome 
country-specific scrutiny, and then Part 2 shows the Group's recent willingness to address country-
specific human rights problems. With an eye on the three possible explanations of the African Group's 
shift, the first two parts draw attention to the actions of specific delegations, US influence, and instances 
where non-democratic African countries were more supportive of human rights than democracies, while 
Part 3 directly examines the three possible explanations. The concluding section considers the 
implications of the findings. 
In addition to the usual documentary sources, the article draws on twenty open-ended interviews. Eleven 
took place in 2013, during which questions focused on the African Group. Eight interviews are drawn 
from a 2012 research project on South Africa's role on the HRC, while one is drawn from a 2014 research 
project on sexual orientation rights at the UN, and is included because it touched on matters relevant to 
the present article. Nineteen interviews took place in Geneva, and one in Bern. Four interviews were with 
African diplomats, four with Western diplomats, six with human rights activists, four with international 
civil servants, and two with academics. Most of my interview requests to diplomatic missions in Geneva 
(African or otherwise) were unsuccessful. The disappointing number of interviews with African 
diplomats is mitigated by interviews with human rights activists and UN officials familiar with the 
African Group. Many interviewees from these two groups expressed support for causes that Western 
states tend to resist, such as the Durban process on racism and the right to development, which should 
assuage concerns about pro-Western bias. 
The article understands human rights as universal, individualistic, and with an emphasis on civil and 
political rights. Amnesty International's positions are used to guide judgements about which are the 
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stronger human rights options on the HRC. Freedom House scores are used to indicate a country's human 
rights situation31 and its level of democracy.32 Freedom House measures the level of political rights and 
civil liberties in countries, scales them from 1 to 7 (with 7 being the least free) and categorizes countries 
into ‘free’, ‘partly free’, and ‘unfree’. Countries that Freedom House regards as ‘free’ (with an average 
score between 1 and 2.5) are here taken as ‘democracies’, while ‘partly free’ and ‘not free’ states are 
regarded as non-democratic. Twenty-seven African states served on the Council between 2006 and 2013. 
Seven were ‘free’ during their tenure (Benin, Botswana, Ghana, Mali, Mauritius, Sierra Leone, and South 
Africa). Senegal was ‘free’ during the first two years of its six-year membership. Of the non-democratic 
states, nine (Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Mauritania, and Tunisia), 
excluding Libya and Djibouti, were classified as ‘not free’.33 
The early years 
This section presents four prominent early examples of the African Group's attempts to weaken HRC 
scrutiny of human rights problems in specific countries. During the HRC's institution-building first year, 
the African Group worked to weaken the HRC's investigative system and to shield states from criticism 
under the HRC's new instrument: the Universal Periodic Review. On the cases of Darfur and the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the African Group protected the respective governments and 
tried to limit the involvement of the HRC. 
Established in 1967, the special procedures represent the ‘crown jewel’ in the UN human rights system.34 
Special procedures mandate holders are independent human rights experts appointed to investigate and 
report on human rights in a specific country or on a particular theme. They also draw the attention of 
governments to alleged violations, develop international human rights standards, perform human rights 
advocacy, and provide technical advice. The African Group led the attack on the special procedures. It 
sought to strengthen the hand of states and restrict the ability of mandate holders to investigate and 
publicize human rights abuses. The most serious aspect of the African Group's attack was its proposal of a 
code of conduct, ostensibly to clarify ‘the principles and rules governing the behaviour of mandate 
holders’. A code of conduct, the African Group said, would ‘strengthen the capacity’ of the mandate 
holders and enhance ‘their moral authority and credibility’. Although the African Group reaffirmed that 
the independence of mandate holders was ‘absolute in nature’,35 the code of conduct was widely 
perceived as an attack on their independence.36 According to the African Group proposal, mandate 
holders were to prepare for a country visit in ‘close collaboration’ with the government's mission in 
Geneva, ‘finalize the official programme of their visits with the host country representatives’, and, while 
on mission, remain, for security reasons, ‘in the care of the host authorities at all times’.37 As critics noted, 
such ‘close collaboration’ might compromise the anonymity of sources of information and might lead to 
the moving of witnesses before the mandate holder's arrival.38 The African Group further required 
mandate holders to respect the national legislation of the host country and rejected the suggestion that 
such compliance should depend on whether it was in accordance with international human rights 
principles.39 
The proposed code of conduct also tried to restrict communications from special procedures mandate 
holders. Mandate holders were to direct urgent communications exclusively to the relevant state's mission 
in Geneva, rather than, say, to a particular government department. Mandate holders were to avoid public 
allegations of human rights violations ‘that have not been previously addressed to the concerned state 
with adequate time for investigation, reply and, when appropriate, action’,40 a provision that implied ‘a 
delay of many months’.41 Crucially, the proposed code of conduct also opened up various fronts on which 
to criticize mandate holders, who had to behave ‘in such a way as to maintain and reinforce the trust they 
enjoy from all stakeholders’, to ‘show restraint, moderation and discretion’, and to avoid statements that 
might ‘undermine a constructive dialogue among stakeholders’.42 At the same time, the African Group 
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rejected the suggestion that states should be subject to a code of conduct in their dealings with mandate 
holders,43 while South Africa in particular rejected the suggestion that HRC members should extend 
standing invitations to all who held special procedures mandates.44 
The African Group further attempted to render the HRC's new mechanism, the Universal Periodic 
Review, as unthreatening to states as possible. Developing countries frequently complained that the CHR 
was a vehicle for the West to single out and “shame” its opponents. Resolution 60/251 therefore created 
the Universal Periodic Review, a ‘cooperative mechanism’ to assess the human rights performance of all 
UN members.45 Resolution 60/251 left many of the details for the HRC to decide during its first year. 
The Universal Periodic Review works in the following way. All UN members are reviewed once every 
four years. The review is conducted by the Universal Periodic Review Working Group, which consists of 
the HRC's 47 members. The state under review is assisted by a troika of states, drawn by lot. The review 
is based on a national report drawn up by the state, UN sources such as treaty bodies or special procedures 
reports, and information provided by NGOs and national human rights institutions. After the Working 
Group's review, the troika and the state under review draw up an outcome report, which includes 
recommendations to the state under review. The plenary of the HRC then adopts the final report. NGOs 
may attend and, although they may not speak during the Working Group meetings, they may make 
statements during HRC's regular sessions when the outcome reports are considered.46 
The Universal Periodic Review has proved to be a weak mechanism.47 Had the African Group had its 
way, it would have been even weaker. During the institution-building phase, the African Group 
repeatedly stressed that the Universal Periodic Review should be ‘cooperative’, not ‘confrontational’,48 
meaning tough criticism should be avoided. The African Group further tried in numerous ways to obstruct 
scrutiny and criticism of states. It wanted each state to draw up its own report, complemented by UN 
documents. However, it did not want the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to compile 
these documents, which effectively would have excluded treaty body and special procedures reports.49 
Initially, the African Group did not make provision for contributions from NGOs at the national level,50 
but later accepted NGO involvement in a state-directed process.51 It opposed NGO input at the 
international level,52 which would have translated into ‘zero input in those states where NGO input is 
most required’.53 African states further opposed the involvement of independent experts in the review 
because this, apparently, would reduce state ‘ownership’ and make the process more accusatory.54 
The African Group further wanted the candidate country's regional group or its ‘friends’, rather than 
randomly assigned countries, to assist with the initial report. Regarding the frequency of reviews, the 
African Group argued that developing countries would need more time to prepare and implement 
recommendations and should therefore be on a longer cycle than industrialized states, which again 
amounted to reduced scrutiny where the human rights were generally worse.55 The African Group 
maintained that the adoption of the outcome report, and thus the recommendations contained therein, 
should be with the consent of the concerned state, thus giving the state under review a veto over an HRC 
decision.56 As for questions about non-compliance with Universal Periodic Review recommendations, the 
African Group invoked the need to avoid confrontation and politicization.57 
Despite massive human rights violations in Darfur during the HRC's initial years, the HRC struggled to 
address these problems in the region and elsewhere in Sudan. The African Group, alongside the 
Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), were the prime obstructers of HRC action. A Secretary-
General's report on Darfur released in November 2006 found that Sudanese government forces and 
associated militias were responsible for human rights violations that ‘may amount to crimes against 
humanity’.58 On 29 November 2006, Kofi Annan suggested to the five-month-old HRC that they shelve 
their obsession with Israel – up to that point, the HRC had had held three special sessions, all on Israel – 
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and pay attention to Darfur.59 Twenty-nine HRC member states, including nine from Africa, duly signed a 
call for a special session on human rights in Darfur, which was held on 12–13 December 2006. The 
African Group claimed that such widespread support showed that the HRC was putting ‘people before 
politics’,60 but in reality the African Group, despite a dissenting minority, was set on shielding the 
Sudanese government. 
The African Group identified the purpose of the special session as making an ‘objective diagnosis’ of the 
situation in Darfur, allegedly distorted by ‘propaganda’ and ‘media-driven interpretations’.61 The 
European Union (EU) pointed out that the problems in Darfur were well-documented and the special 
session should therefore focus on implementing existing recommendations on improving human rights.62 
However, the EU, having two weeks before decisively lost a vote related to Darfur,63 accepted the 
decision to send only a fact-finding mission to Darfur. Khartoum's delight with this outcome testified to 
the weakness of the chosen course of action.64 
Next, conflict arose over the composition of the fact-finding mission. The African Group wanted to send 
state representatives to Darfur, apparently to prove the HRC's seriousness and ‘incontrovertibly’ to 
establish the facts.65 The EU wanted to send independent experts. After an initial vague compromise and 
another month of wrangling, Nobel Laureate Jody Williams was appointed to lead a six-person team, 
which problematically included the Indonesian ambassador who had previously defended Khartoum.66 
Significantly, he resigned nine days after the mission had begun its work. Furthermore, Sudan refused to 
furnish the mission with the necessary visas, objecting that one of the mission's members, Bertrand 
Ramcharan, was biased because during a stint as Acting High Commissioner of Human Rights he had 
overseen a report suggesting Sudan had committed acts possibly amounting to crimes against humanity.67 
Williams would not let Sudan dictate the membership of the mission. Unable to enter Darfur, the mission 
conducted interviews in Addis Ababa, Geneva, N'Djamena, and refugee camps in eastern Chad. 
The Williams mission concluded that the Sudanese government and its militias were the primary 
perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur.68 However, the HRC spent little time 
on the report's findings. Rather, the debate got stuck on whether or not to adopt the report. While 
Cameroon, Ghana, Nigeria, Mauritius, Senegal, and Zambia favoured adopting the report, Algeria, Egypt, 
and Tunisia were opposed, arguing that the report lacked legitimacy because the mission had not gone to 
Darfur, the Gabonese ambassador had not visited Chad, and the mission was not regionally representative 
(the Indonesian ambassador had not been replaced). Moreover, the ‘controversy surrounding the mission’ 
ran counter to a ‘consensual approach’, which ‘in itself’ cast doubt on the report.69 
Although the African Group had split on the matter, there were enough African and Islamic countries, 
plus a few others, to obstruct the report. As a compromise, it was agreed to ask seven special procedures 
mandate holders to assist the Sudanese government with implementing previous UN human rights 
recommendations. In November 2007, the expert group reported that despite ‘very good cooperation’ 
from the Sudanese government, various recommendations had not been implemented and that 
government efforts had, despite ‘very few exceptions … not yet led to an improvement’ of human rights 
in Darfur.70 The African Group, however, commended Sudan's ‘concerted efforts’ and asserted that ‘the 
time ha[d] come for ending the proliferation of human rights mechanisms in Sudan’.71 Another EU–
African Group compromise terminated the expert group's mandate and placed it under that of the special 
rapporteur on Sudan. The African Group stated their satisfaction with this arrangement, but warned of its 
general opposition to country-specific mandates. Indeed, in September 2008, the African Group claimed 
that the situation had improved enough to end the Sudan mandate.72 Another EU–African Group 
compromise extended the mandate for nine months, rather than the usual twelve. In June 2009, the 
African Group tabled a resolution to terminate the Sudan mandate.73 However, an EU amendment to 
extend the mandate for another year was adopted by 20–19–8 (yes–no–abstain). Zambia and Mauritius 
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voted in favour, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal abstained, while seven African states, 
including South Africa, voted no. The subsequent resolution was then adopted 20–18–9, with Mauritius 
and Zambia voting in favour; Angola, Burkina Faso, Gabon, Ghana, Madagascar, and Senegal abstaining; 
and South Africa and Nigeria among those opposed. 
During the HRC's initial years, the African Group also managed to end HRC scrutiny focused on the 
DRC. In his February 2008 report, the independent expert on human rights in the DRC paints a miserable 
picture: ‘flagrant’ impunity, increased sexual violence, massive internal displacement, child soldiers, no 
‘concrete improvement’ in political and civil rights, and economic rights a ‘distant dream’ for most.74 In 
March 2008, however, the African Group opposed extending the independent expert's mandate. They 
argued that the mandate had ‘no clear achievement’, whereas the DRC had made ‘significant’ political 
progress, had held presidential elections that provided a ‘democratic environment conducive to the 
promotion and protection of human rights’, and had undertaken ‘serious measures’ to realize economic, 
social, and cultural rights.75 Behind the African Group's claims lay the DRC government's opposition to 
the mandate. The DRC, however, was willing to consider mechanisms other than a country-specific 
mandate and hence agreed to receive recommendations from seven thematic mandate holders. 
Before the seven mandate holders could even submit their first report, due in March 2009, renewed 
violence broke out in eastern DRC. In response, the HRC convened a special session on 28 November 
2008, which the African Group opposed. During the session, the EU tabled a draft resolution asking the 
Special Rapporteurs on extrajudicial executions and on torture to visit the region and report back.76 
However, the African Group tabled a rival draft,77 which did not ask for a specific investigation. A 
compromise resolution called for the seven mandate holders and the High Commissioner to report in 
March 2009, but there was to be no specific investigation. 
In March 2009, the mandate holders reported, as they would in 2010 and 2011, that human rights in the 
DRC had not improved. In each report, the mandate holders recommended the creation of a mandate 
focused exclusively on the DRC.78 In 2009, the EU and Canada included this recommendation in a draft 
resolution,79 but the African Group won a procedural vote to make its draft, which contained no such 
recommendation, the basis of discussion. The EU then proposed amendments to the African draft that 
included asking the seven mandate holders to monitor progress on human rights and to coordinate their 
assistance to the government,80 but the amendments were rejected 18–21–8. Although Burkina Faso, 
Ghana, Mauritius, Senegal, and Zambia abstained on the amendments vote, all thirteen African members 
voted for the eventual resolution. In 2010 and 2011, there were no more attempts – at least in the plenary 
– to establish a country mandate on the DRC. In March 2011, the group of mandate holders again 
recommended creating a mandate specific to the DRC and asserted that they had achieved all they could 
under the present mandate. The African Group duly used this latter assertion as a ‘recommendation … to 
terminate’ any specific HRC focus on the DRC.81 
An improved showing 
As shown above, during the HRC's early years the African Group sought to weaken and obstruct external 
scrutiny of human rights in specific countries. However, in late 2010 the HRC began to adopt stronger, 
more clearly pro-human rights resolutions, including on country-specific situations. This section discusses 
the cases of Côte d'Ivoire, Libya, and Eritrea as evidence of the African Group's increased support for 
country-specific efforts in the HRC, but it is worth noting that there are many other examples of the 
African Group supporting such initiatives from 2011 onwards. In 2012, an African Group resolution 
invited a High Commissioner's report on Mali, while in 2013 an African Group resolution asked an 
Independent Expert to monitor human rights in the Central African Republic. In March 2011, the African 
Group registered no objection when the HRC established a mandate on human rights in Iran, the HRC's 
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first new country mandate. The resolution passed 22–7–14; eight African states abstained, Mauritania 
opposed, and Senegal and Zambia voted in favour. On the 2012 Iran resolution, nine African states 
abstained, while Benin, Botswana, Mauritania, and Senegal voted in support. In 2013, nine African states 
abstained, while Botswana, Gabon, Libya, and Sierra Leone voted yes. 
The African Group has also gone along with resolutions on Belarus, which became stronger after the first 
was adopted in June 2011. Only once did an African state vote against the resolution: Nigeria, in June 
2011, alleging selectivity.82 The resolution was adopted 21–5–19, with Gabon, Mauritius, and Zambia in 
favour. In 2012, Nigeria joined seven other African states in abstaining, while Benin, Botswana, Burkina 
Faso, Congo, and Mauritius voted yes. In June 2013, most African states abstained, but Benin, Botswana, 
Burkina Faso, Congo, and Gabon voted in favour. 
Most African states have also voted for the twelve (strong) resolutions on the civil conflict in Syria that 
the HRC adopted between 2011 and 2013. Only once did African states (Gabon and Mauritania) vote 
against a Syria resolution, while Angola and Cameroon abstained a number of times, Ethiopia abstained 
on all three of its votes, and Uganda on ten out of eleven. Whereas in 2009 most African states 
successfully helped to shield Sri Lanka during a special session on human rights in the country, in March 
2012 the US led the HRC to adopt a resolution calling on Sri Lanka to examine and address alleged 
human rights violations that occurred during the country's civil war. Benin, Cameroon, Mauritius, and 
Nigeria voted for the resolution; Angola, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Djibouti, and Senegal abstained; and 
Congo, Mauritania, and Uganda voted against. The 2013 Sri Lanka resolution was adopted 25–13–8, with 
Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Libya, and Sierra Leone voting in favour, five African states abstaining, and the 
same three as in 2012 voting against. 
The HRC's response to the violent conflict that erupted in Côte d'Ivoire in late 2010 marked a change in 
the African Group's approach to human rights crises. In December, Laurent Gbagbo, the incumbent, and 
Alassana Ouattara, his challenger, both claimed victory in the country's presidential election, plunging the 
country into chaos. On 23 December 2010, the HRC, at the instigation of Nigeria (on behalf of the 
African Group) and the US, convened a special session. The HRC unanimously adopted an African 
Group resolution that asked the High Commissioner to report on the Côte d'Ivoire situation in March 
2011. Although the resolution lacked the urgency some critics wanted,83 the African Group's request 
contrasts with its blocking of a European effort in 2006 to have the High Commissioner report on Darfur, 
which the African Group then painted as an effort to ‘name and shame’.84 
The High Commissioner's report described the ‘drastic deterioration in the human rights situation’ in Côte 
d'Ivoire85 and recommended creating an international commission of inquiry to investigate human rights 
violations with the aim of holding such perpetrators to account.86 This recommendation was taken up in a 
unanimously adopted African Group resolution. 
By the HRC's June 2011 session, Gbagbo was under arrest, Ouattara installed as president, and the 
situation somewhat calmer. Led by the African Group, the HRC created an independent expert on human 
rights in Cote d'Ivoire, a positive step although the mandate was restricted to assisting the Ivoirian 
government in implementing the commission of inquiry's recommendations.87 Whilst Côte d'Ivoire 
continued to declare its commitment to human rights and to cooperate with the HRC, reports that 
Ouattara-linked forces were killing, torturing, and arbitrarily detaining former Gbagbo supporters were 
mounting.88 The African Group's June 2013 resolution did not link the Ouattara government to attacks on 
Gbagbo supporters (the report did),89 but was still relatively even-handed in its expression of ‘grave 
concern’ about attacks on (pro-Gbagbo) republican forces and its condemnation of attacks on civilians 
and displaced persons.90 
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In February 2011, as protests and violence broke out in Libya, the African Group went along with strong 
HRC action against the country. On 22 February, Muammar Gaddafi appeared on Libyan television 
promising to ‘purge’ the ‘rats’ increasingly protesting against his rule.91 On 25 February, the HRC held a 
special session on Libya. The African Group was less enthusiastic about this special session than the one 
on Côte d'Ivoire, with Senegal and Tunisia the only African states to join the call for a special session. In 
its statement, the African Group accepted the need for HRC involvement on Libya, condemned violence 
against peaceful protesters, and mentioned African efforts to resolve the Libyan conflict. Western states, 
along with Israel and Palestine (but no African sponsors), then tabled a draft resolution that strongly 
condemned the ‘extremely grave human rights violations’ in Libya, called for a Commission of Inquiry 
and a High Commissioner's report, and recommended Libya's suspension from the HRC. Although the 
resolution was adopted without a vote, the African Group stated ‘firmly’ that the adoption of such a 
resolution ‘should not become a precedent’.92 
At the HRC's March 2011 session, the African Group condemned the Gaddafi regime's indiscriminate use 
of force but found itself at odds with the West. In its statement, made three days before the Security 
Council authorized ‘all necessary measures’ to protect civilians in Libya, the African Group insisted that 
the problems in Libya required ‘urgent African action’ and argued against ‘foreign external 
intervention’.93 The African Group's unease with the prevailing line on Libya continued when the 
Commission of Inquiry presented its report in June 2011. The African Group condemned the Gaddafi 
regime's violence during the early days of the conflict, but nevertheless tried to provide the regime with 
some breathing space. The African Group emphasized that both sides had committed human rights 
violations, such as torture, and expressed its ‘serious concern’94 over the Commission of Inquiry's finding 
that violations committed by opposition forces ‘were not part of any widespread or systematic attack 
against civilians and did not amount to crimes against humanity’.95 A week later, HRC members had to 
consider a draft resolution, which, among other things, sought to extend the Commission of Inquiry.96 
Although six of the resolution's 55 co-sponsors were African (Botswana, Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, 
Senegal, and Zambia), the African Group found some parts of the resolution ‘very difficult’. The African 
Group objected to the implied recognition of the National Transitional Council and mention of the 
International Criminal Court. There was also the insistence, as previously, that this was Africa's problem 
to solve.97 The African solution at that time, which included a ceasefire and political dialogue,98 would no 
doubt have been better for Gaddafi than where events were heading. Ultimately, the African Group stated 
that they would not call for a vote on the draft resolution,99 a mild expression of displeasure and 
disagreement. 
The HRC's actions against Eritrea are remarkable because they are examples of African states leading the 
HRC in criticism and scrutiny of another African state. In July 2012, the HRC adopted a resolution that 
‘strongly condemned’ human rights violations in Eritrea and appointed a special rapporteur on human 
rights in the country.100 Djibouti, Nigeria, and Somalia had sponsored the resolution. More than thirty 
countries joined as co-sponsors, including two more from Africa (Côte d'Ivoire and Namibia). Eritrea 
opposed the resolution and the ‘unfounded allegations’ therein,101 yet the resolution was adopted without 
a vote, as it would be in 2013. 
The African Group's willingness to install a strong mandate against the wishes of another African state is 
a sharp reversal of earlier African Group positions. While Eritrea's human rights record is poor enough to 
warrant a mandate,102 the Eritrea mandate is not decisive proof of the African Group's new-found 
commitment to human rights. Before the adoption of the Eritrea resolutions there were no African Group 
statements, which suggest that the Group is divided on the matter. Moreover, Eritrea is diplomatically 
isolated.103 Furthermore, although the US no longer designates Eritrea as a ‘state sponsor of terrorism’, 
Eritrea has been classified as ‘not cooperating fully’ with US counter-terrorism efforts.104 Finally, the 
mandate is a clear example of ‘politicization’, that is, using human rights problems to punish an 
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adversary. It could hardly have gone unobserved that Somalia and Djibouti also have poor human rights 
records.105 In its statement, Ethiopia, another of Eritrea's neighbours, could not even keep human rights 
and regional politics in separate sentences, imploring the international community to ‘hold the 
Government of Eritrea accountable for its gross and systematic human rights violations against Eritreans 
and its blatant acts against the peace and security of the region’.106 
Accounting for the improvement 
The preceding two sections demonstrated that the African Group has moved from obstructing to 
supporting initiatives that scrutinize country-specific human rights problems. This section considers the 
three possible explanations for this shift that were presented in the introduction and argues that US 
influence was decisive. 
The first potential explanation is that the African Group's shift stems from an improvement in domestic 
human rights records of its members. However, this explanation is not plausible. Votes related to Sudan, 
the DRC, Belarus, Iran, and Sri Lanka contained examples of African countries with poor domestic rights 
records voting in a more pro-human rights way than African democracies. More significantly, Table 1 
shows that although the African Group has become more supportive of country-specific human rights 
scrutiny, since 2006 the human rights profile of the thirteen African HRC members has deteriorated: a 
rise in their aggregate Freedom House scores, a decline in the number of ‘free’ African members and a 
rise in the number of ‘not free’ African members. Surprisingly, the African Group's profile reached its 
nadir in 2010–11, just as it made a turn towards support for country-specific initiatives.107 
Table 1 
Freedom House aggregates and categories of HRC members, 2006–13 
  
2006–
7  
2007–
8  
2008–
9  
2009–
10  
2010–
11  
2011–
12  
2013*  
Aggregate of African Group (13 members)  48.5  48  50  52.5  57  54**  57.5  
Number of ‘free’ states in African Group  5  5  3  3  2  3  2  
Number of ‘not free’ states in African Group  5  3  3  4  6  5**  5  
Aggregate of all members, excluding African 
Group (34 states)  
99  104  100  98  101.5  99.5  87.5  
Number of ‘free’ states, excluding African 
Group  
20  18  19  20  16  17  20  
Number of ‘not free’ states, excluding 
African Group  
6  7  6  8  7  6  3  
* During the first five cohorts, a third of HRC members were replaced in June or July each year. 
However, during 2011–12, a third of the cohort was only replaced in December 2012, leaving the third to 
replace them to start in January 2013. For each cohort, countries are scored at the beginning of their term: 
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for example, the scores for the 2006–7 term uses the Freedom in the World 2007 report, as it refers to 
conditions in 2006. 
** Gaddafi was overthrown in 2011. Under Gaddafi, Freedom House scored Libya 6.5. After Gaddafi's 
removal, Libya scored 4.5 (‘partly free’), the score used here. 
Source: Adapted from Freedom House's various ‘Freedom in the World’ reports. 
The second potential explanation – that changed dynamics within the African Group, especially the 
reduced influence of regressive states, led to the Group's change of course – holds part of the answer. The 
expense of maintaining a diplomatic mission in Geneva108 puts better-resourced delegations such as 
Algeria, Egypt, and South Africa in a position of influence over smaller African delegations.109 These 
three states, all three with regressive agendas, were particularly influential during the HRC's first years. 
Algeria was African Group coordinator during the Council's first year. Algerian ambassador Idriss Jazaïry 
is a charismatic and skilful diplomat who kept the African Group on a tight leash.110 The African Group's 
push for a code of conduct for special procedures mandate holders was ‘ultimately his personal 
project’.111 Jazaïry was also ‘at the heart’ of the African Group's positions on Darfur.112 Egypt was the 
African Group coordinator from 2007 to 2009. In this leadership role, Egypt sometimes made claims in 
the name of the African Group beyond those to which the Group had actually assented.113 Moreover, 
Egypt exerted a powerful and, according to an American internal report, ‘heavy-handed’ influence over 
the African Group, while the Egyptian ambassador allowed his delegation to be ‘harsh and aggressive’.114 
Egypt was central to the African Group's obstruction of stronger action on the DRC.115 
South Africa is a ‘key player’ in the African Group,116 with the Group unlikely to adopt a position without 
South Africa's consent.117 The characterization of South Africa as regressive might surprise some, 
especially considering Nelson Mandela's early promise that the ‘light’ of human rights would guide 
democratic South Africa's foreign policy,118 but there is much evidence. During South Africa's first 
membership stint, from 2006 until 2010, South Africa shielded the governments of the DRC, Sri Lanka, 
and Sudan, repeatedly abstained on resolutions pressuring North Korea, and supported deep restrictions 
on the right to free expression.119 In June 2011, South Africa led the HRC to adopt the first-ever UN 
resolution on sexual orientation, a progressive but exceptional action that stemmed from a South African 
miscalculation three months before when it tried to suppress the discussion of sexual orientation 
throughout the UN.120 Since rejoining the HRC in 2014, South Africa has abstained on resolutions on 
Belarus, Iran, North Korea, Sri Lanka, and Syria, and has supported efforts to weaken resolutions related 
to the right to peaceful protest and to the protection of free expression on the Internet.121 
However, the regressive influence of these three states did not last. The ending of Algeria's membership 
in June 2007 and an African counter-reaction to Egypt's overbearing leadership reduced the influence of 
these two countries.122 Moreover, the 2011 Egyptian revolution also softened some of the country's 
positions,123 while South Africa's leadership on the sexual orientation resolution, which the African Group 
vehemently opposed, cost South Africa ‘friends and allies’124 and reduced the Group's confidence in 
South Africa.125 
While the reduced influence of these three regressive states contributed to the African Group's shift,126 it 
is an inadequate explanation. For one thing, the timing does not quite fit. The African Group persisted in 
obstructing country-specific action long after Algeria's membership expired. Although unhappiness about 
Egyptian leadership predated the Côte d'Ivoire crisis, South Africa's leadership on sexual orientation and 
the Egyptian revolution happened after. Furthermore, changes such as a declining propensity of states to 
vote along regional lines,127 and Maldives breaking with the OIC, which paved the way for other Islamic 
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countries to break with OIC positions,128 suggest the influence of elements beyond the African Group. 
The main external event around this time was the return of the US to the HRC. 
In 2006, the Bush administration declined to seek membership of the HRC but nevertheless undertook to 
contribute to and engage with the new body. However, in April 2008, the Bush administration withheld 
the American share of the HRC's budget and two months later announced its disengagement from the 
HRC, except for on matters of significant national interest.129 Not being a Council member limited US 
influence; disengagement reduced it further.130 
Under the new Obama administration, the US became an HRC member in June 2009. While initial US 
disengagement had allowed the likes of Egypt and Algeria to come to the fore,131 the US's entry put the 
anti-human rights lobby on the defensive and threatened the past influence of ‘unfriendly’ delegations, 
‘South Africa chief among them’. Some African states even began asking the US to push other African 
Group members towards positions that the US itself supported.132 
American influence went beyond the African Group. After the September 2009 session, numerous 
delegations told the US that the session had been the Council's ‘most successful in memory and that the 
US presence had made the difference’.133 Over the longer term, US engagement made ‘a valuable 
contribution’ to pushing the HRC in a stronger human rights direction, according to Amnesty 
International, Human Rights Watch, and Freedom House.134 We can place the US at the scene of many of 
the HRC's successes. US influence reversed a tendency to avoid country-specific scrutiny,135 successfully 
leading new resolutions on Iran, Syria, and Sri Lanka. The US also negotiated an end to the divisive 
defamation of religion resolutions and led on the creation of a special rapporteur on freedom of 
association and peaceful assembly.136 The US also looms over the three African cases discussed earlier: 
the US and the African Group called for a special session on Côte d'Ivoire; American leadership lay 
behind the condemnation and suspension from the HRC of Gaddafi's Libya;137 and Eritrea had incurred 
the displeasure of the US through its association with terrorism. 
What was the nature of US influence? The realist conception of power – using material resources to get 
others to do what they otherwise would not – dominates the field of international relations.138 American 
diplomats I interviewed deny the use of aid as a bargaining tool on the HRC. Indeed, mention of using aid 
to buy influence on the HRC is rare.139 When asked about material inducements, a diplomat from a major 
European power explained that for his country it was a ‘general relationship issue’.140 In other words, 
material inducements are present, but only diffusely. Presumably the same goes for the US as research 
linking US aid and voting coincidence rates in the UN suggests.141 Even so, ‘multiple forms of power are 
simultaneously present in international politics’.142 Soft power – getting what one wants not by coercion 
or payment but through the attractiveness of a country's culture, policies, and political ideals143– can exist 
alongside hard power144 and, in the case of the US on the HRC, it has. Eileen Donahoe, US 
Representative to the HRC (2010–13), noted that her task was made easier by a ‘very deep reservoir of 
goodwill’ towards the US, an ‘association’ of the US with human rights, and the message of hope and 
change that surrounded Obama's election as US president.145 
However, power does not automatically translate into the necessary votes and resolutions. Diplomacy is 
needed. Donahoe was central to developing a diplomatic strategy that centred on ‘human skills’.146 This 
strategy entailed extensive lobbying, willingness to work with any delegation to advance an issue,147 and 
respecting and listening carefully to other perspectives.148 The US further tried to crack bloc loyalties149 
and to build cross-regional support on issues.150 To prevent opponents from characterizing an initiative as 
a Western imposition, the US avoided first turning to their Western allies for support.151 In the American 
assessment, their approach yielded ‘tremendous results’.152 The American approach of listening carefully 
and working cross-regionally seems to have resonated with the African Group's dislike of ‘self-appointed 
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custodians of human rights’ and its ‘pining’ for ‘shared ownership’ and inclusion as ‘effective joint 
stakeholders’.153 
Did power or diplomacy make the difference? For Ted Piccone, ‘effective US diplomatic strategy’ led to 
increased country scrutiny.154 While the US's ‘human skills’ approach was well chosen, and certainly 
more productive than the ‘arrogant’ unilateralism of the Bush years,155 one should not overlook that this 
diplomacy was attached to American power. Diplomacy alone, no matter how appropriate and skilful, 
would have been unlikely to push the HRC in a more pro-human rights direction. Compare, for instance, 
recent US diplomacy to that of the EU during the HRC's early years. The EU was expected, during the 
US's initial absence, to be a leader in the HRC.156 Although the EU's ‘outreach’ to other countries was not 
optimal,157 the EU was pragmatic, engaged ‘moderate’ developing countries, sought consensus, tried to 
build cross-regional support on country mandates, and compromised extensively. In other words, the EU's 
strategy was not unlike the US's, yet the EU failed to play a leadership role.158 Whilst there are a number 
of contextual factors to consider, including varied post-colonial relationships, differences in US and EU 
power seem an important reason for these different outcomes. 
Conclusion 
The history of Africa's engagement with the UN has been marked by strain, bloc voting, an insistence 
from African countries on the principles of sovereignty, self-determination, and non-interference, and a 
sense that Africa has little say in matters that affect them. Despite this past, at the HRC the African Group 
has in recent years become less inclined to vote as a bloc. The African Group has also become 
increasingly willing to support intrusive measures to attend to human rights violations in developing 
countries, and, when addressing such problems in Africa, has often assumed leadership. Moreover, during 
recent HRC initiatives on African states, African and Western states have acted more cooperatively than 
during early efforts in the HRC to address human rights problems in Sudan and the DRC. 
This article found that the African Group's movement from obstructer to supporter of country-specific 
scrutiny did not stem from an improvement in the domestic human rights records of the Group's members. 
The loss of influence among influential regressive states is part of the reason for the African Group's shift, 
but as preceding voting records and American diplomatic cables show, the African Group had no 
outstanding human rights champions poised to take the lead.159 Rather, it appears that the combination of 
US power and apposite diplomacy drew an African Group less influenced by regressive states in a pro-
human rights direction. 
The HRC's poor record before the US joined, the centrality of the US to the African Group, and the 
HRC's later shift towards human rights, challenge the liberal claim that a less American world will remain 
a liberal world. Although realism's conception of power is too narrow to capture all aspects of US 
influence, the findings of this article nevertheless support the realist view that hierarchy is necessary for 
the realization of liberal internationalism. 
The case of the HRC shows that if US power was necessary, so was US engagement. However, herein 
resides a potential problem for sustaining the HRC's liberal trajectory. According to HRC rules, members 
serve a three-year term and may not be re-elected immediately after two consecutive terms. After six 
years as member, the US left the HRC in 2015. In the US, there exists a tradition of antagonism and 
mistrust towards the UN. Although this is usually associated with the Republican Party, even within the 
Obama administration the decision to join the HRC was ‘very contested’.160 Thus, there is a chance that 
the US will disengage from and not seek re-election to the HRC. In so far as the African Group's shift is 
the result of US influence rather than changes internal to Africa, the African Group could be expected to 
revert to its earlier illiberalism in the not unlikely event of a US retreat from the HRC. 
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It is possible that a strengthening of democracy across Africa, which implies a deeper commitment to 
human rights as well as more space for civil society, will generate support for human rights at the UN. 
However, the prospects are not encouraging. A 2015 Freedom House report informs us that, globally, 
civil and political rights have been in decline for nine consecutive years. Moreover, democratic ideals are 
‘under greater threat than at any point in the last 25 years’.161 Africa has seen a few positive 
developments, most notably Tunisia's democratization, but the continent-wide trend does not point 
towards stronger civil freedoms and political rights.162 
Finally, the US's impact on the HRC dents frequent claims that the superpower's influence is on the wane. 
Contrast, for instance, US influence on the HRC with the struggle of China, the US's main geopolitical 
rival, to assert itself in the same institution. During the HRC's early years, China kept a low profile. 
However, faced with the implications of the 2011 Arab Spring for social unrest at home, China became 
more assertive at the HRC. China has long opposed intrusive country-specific measures, but after the 
Arab Spring became more active in attacking resolutions linked to political protests. For instance, in June 
2012, China threatened to call a vote on a resolution on human rights and the Internet, but eventually 
declined to do so.163 In June 2014, China proposed a hostile amendment to a follow-up to the human 
rights and the Internet resolution, but it was defeated 15–28–4, with only four African states voting with 
China.164 In March 2014, China and its allies tabled hostile amendments to a resolution on human rights 
and peaceful protest. However, the amendments were rejected and the resolution was adopted by a wide 
margin, 31–9–7, with only two African states voting alongside China.165 In other words, although China 
has begun to ‘show some power’,166 its efforts have not won major support, even among African states. 
China's lack of success is significant because at the same time as it was becoming a more assertive player 
on the HRC, the US re-engaged with the HRC and managed to steer it in a more liberal direction, with 
important consequences for the conduct of the African Group on human rights. 
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